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Abstract 
Altruism is one of the single most important social preferences driving human behaviour. In 
Psychology experiments, the Social Discounting Task is employed as a measure of altruism. 
A conventional laboratory experiment was conducted with 117 undergraduate students, with 
students randomly assigned to complete an incentivized and un-incentivized Social 
Discounting Task. In accordance with the 1/d law of giving, the results exhibit the expected 
inverse relationship between social distance and altruism. There is weak evidence that 
incentivizing the Social Discounting Task impacts the measurement of altruism in a student 
population. More specifically, subjects are more altruistic when incentivized, possibly due to 
enforced reciprocity. At the same time, making payments real influence the identity of the 
target recipients: paying makes subjects more likely to choose people who are physically and 
psychologically close at high ranks, and more likely to report greater physical and 
psychological distance to subjects at lower ranks. Further research is required to verify the 
robustness of this result. The study also shows that among students family members are more 
altruistic toward each other as are those exhibiting greater intergenerational solidarity. 
Preferences for altruism in this student population is no different from WEIRD subject 
populations. 
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1. Introduction 
In the social discounting task (SDT) that is often used in experimental psychology to examine 
patterns of altruism, subjects identify individuals at different social distances and play a 
linked series of modified dictator games against the nominee at each social distance. In a 
typical experiment (e.g. Olson et al., 2016; Rachlin & Locey, 2011) subjects are asked to 
nominate specific individuals at particular social distances from 1 to 100. For instance, #1 
might be a parent or a spouse, #5 might be a close friend and so on. For each of the nominees, 
subjects make a series of bilateral choices between money for themselves and money for the 
other person. The questions are structured so that there is a clear trend in the sums of money 
and the choice at which the subject switches from a sum for themselves to a sum for the other 
person is used to construct a measure of how altruistic feelings fall as potential partners 
become more socially distant.  
Typically, payments are hypothetical in a SDT experiment. In fact in the approximately 
twenty-five experiments on social discounting conducted to date, few employ real payments.3 
The exceptions are Locey, Jones and Rachlin (2011) who execute one randomly chosen task 
for payment and the recent work by Strombach et al. (2014/2015/2016) who also choose one 
task at random, though they pay only 10% of the face value of amounts used in the actual 
experiment.4 Economists are largely sceptical of the value of experiments in which no real 
payments are made (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001) and even within the SDT literature, Yi, 
Carter and Landes (2012), recognise the limitation of the widespread use of hypothetical 
incentives in social discounting experiments. Making payments real might affect the apparent 
weight that subjects place on money received by recipients. In addition, in the standard 
protocol for an SDT the subject nominates the recipient shortly before making their choices. 
As a result, having real payments may also change the set of people who are nominated, an 
issue that has not been examined in the few studies that do have real payments.5 One reason 
why the set may change depending on payment rules is related to the reason why real 
payments may change the level of payment. When payments are hypothetical the theoretical 
                                                          
3 Experiments considered for inclusion in the literature review represent those that not only administered a 
social discounting task (SDT) to subjects, but analysed the resultant data – examples of studies that do not apply 
any quantitative analysis to the social discounting data include Liu et al. (2015) and Safin, Arfer and Rachlin 
(2015). 
4 To be clear, subjects are informed that this will be the case. 
5 Strombach et al. (2014, 2015, 2016) only have a real payment treatment. Locey et al. (2011) have both 
hypothetical and real payment treatments, but depart from the typical practice of SDT tasks by asking subjects 
to pre-nominate recipients. While this means that their analysis can focus on the pure effect of real payments on 
the switching point, it means that they cannot analyse whether, in the typical SDT experiment, the set of 
recipients is affected by the hypothetical nature of the task. 
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recipient never has a reason to think they have been the object of an experiment and that 
someone made a decision about giving them money. However, when payments are real the 
recipient may receive money and in this case she or he may be able to identify the donor even 
if this information is not formally given out. Anticipating this possibility, the experimental 
subject may wish to be generous (to avoid social embarrassment for example, or because 
there is some possibility of future reciprocity). At the same time, the subject faced with the 
possibility of real payment may choose their target recipient in a different way when 
payments are real. They may, for instance, choose someone who is more likely to reciprocate 
or someone with whom they would not feel social embarrassment at giving little.  
Apart from the hypothetical nature of payments, another fact that can influence behaviour in 
a SDT task is the pattern of human relationships in a particular country. In particular, 
preferences, and in this case social discounting, may be quite different in a society governed 
by a more collectivist culture in which the wider family and other social networks play an 
important role. This point has been made quite forcefully for social science experiments in 
general by Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) who emphasize that the overwhelming 
majority of social psychology (and economics) experimental data comes from subjects who 
are “WEIRD”, i.e. from a Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic country. 
In keeping with the typical pattern of social psychology experiments, most SDT research has 
been conducted within “WEIRD” environments. 
So, the contribution of this research is that it investigates the extent to which using real 
payments in the Social Discounting Task matters for the measurement of altruism, both in 
terms of the level of measured altruism and also in the set of recipients. It does so in a 
location outside the usual WEIRD setting. A related objective of the paper is to investigate 
the role of specific sender and recipient characteristics in explaining differences in observed 
inter-personal altruism, including the role of family relations and other social dynamics.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a brief overview of the empirical 
literature, while Section 3 and 4 describes the experimental task and methods of analysis, 
respectively. Section 5 contains the results and their discussion. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
With social discounting tasks in some ways being comparable to a dictator game (i.e. a 
choice is made between money for oneself and money for someone else in a two-person 
economic game), it is important to at the outset make reference to the literature on dictator 
giving and social distance. 6  Empirically, researchers have mimicked social distance by 
experimentally inducing differences in the degree of anonymity between dictator and 
recipient (Bechler, Green & Myerson, 2015; Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Charness & Gneezy, 
2008; Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996; Margittai et al., 2015). Brañas-Garza et al. (2010) 
found that social integration and social distance are complementary determinants of altruism. 
Goeree et al. (2010) and Leider et al. (2009) adopted a different approach to the study of 
altruism and social distance, collecting information on subjects’ social networks. In both 
instances, the findings emphasise the important role of social distance in explaining 
differences in altruism, with giving declining with social distance. Goeree et al. (2010) 
describes this relationship as a simple inverse distance law or so-called 1/d law of giving.7 
The existing empirical literature on the Social Discounting Task (SDT) is relatively extensive, 
with twenty-six studies having been conducted to date (Box 1). These studies can be 
described as follows: 
Social discounting tasks: There are two basic variants of the Social Discounting Task (SDT). 
In the original, Jones and Rachlin (2006) have subjects choose between a declining amount 
for themselves and a fixed, equally shared amount for themselves and the relevant person on 
the list, e.g. row 1 offering $155 for you alone (option A) versus $75 for you and $75 for the 
first person on the list (option B)(Sharp et al., 2012. Rachlin and Jones (2008b) in turn have 
subjects face a choice between a declining amount for themselves and a fixed amount for the 
relevant person on the list, e.g. row 1 offering $85 for you alone (option A) versus $75 for the 
first person (#1) on the list (option B)(Jones & Rachlin, 2009).8 
                                                          
6 Margittai et al. (2015), for example, have subjects play a dictator game with a recipient at each of eight social 
distances, i.e. 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100. Leider et al. (2009) also employs a modified dictator game akin to the 
Social Discounting Task. The game is called the allocation game and requires decision-makers to “report the 
maximum price that they would be willing to pay in order for their partner to receive a gain of $30” (Leider et 
al., 2009: 1827). 
7 Similar results have been obtained using other economics games. Etang, Fielding and Knowles (2011) let 
subjects play a trust game (TG) and find that trust declines with social distance. Bechler et al. (2015), in their 
study on social distance, add an ultimatum game (UG) to their dictator game (DG) experiment and report that 
proposers offered a significantly lower proportion of the initial endowment as the social distance between 
proposer and responder increased. 
8 There is a small literature that describes social discounting differently and employs a different task to elicit 
what is called the “index of selfishness” (Ostaszewski & Osínski, 2011). In this task, subjects make 
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In the standard tasks, subjects have to envisage a social distance ladder calibrated numerically 
between 1 (closest person) and 100 (furthest person)(see procedures) and then complete the 
set of choice tasks for persons at specific social distances, typically 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100. In 
some experiments, though, ‘partners’ are defined by specific relations rather than a number 
on a social distance continuum, e.g. ‘stranger’, ‘acquaintance’, ‘uncle’, ‘sibling’, ‘parent’ 
(Boyer, Lienard & Xu, 2012; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012), sometimes after rating the perceived 
social distance to each relation (Strombach et al., 2014/2015). 
The two standard tasks, for methodological reasons, have been modified in various ways in 
experiments. One example of such a study is Yi et al. (2011), who incorporated a delay 
condition into the task, while He and Jiang (2013) frames the task as gains and losses. Kaplan 
et al. (2014), using vignettes, framed the SDT in relation to concern and willingness to act in 
the case of a hypothetical environmental loss, in this case air pollution. 
Subjects: The majority of social discounting studies use students as participants. Therefore, 
these experiments can be classified as conventional laboratory experiments on Harrison and 
List’s (2004) taxonomy. However, some studies recruited field subjects and represent 
artefactual or framed field experiments (Harrison & List, 2004). Bradstreet et al. (2012) 
studied social discounting in pregnant women who smoke, analysing social discounting 
amongst smokers, non-smokers and quitters. Participants in Boyer et al.’s (2012) experiment 
included Chinese employees and Kenyan herders, while Sharp et al. (2012) in turn studied 2nd 
to 12th grade boys. Yi et al. (2011) employed active methamphetamine users as subjects, and 
Olson et al. (2016) 18-45 year old community members. 
Size: The experiments can be described as relatively small, with the number of subjects 
ranging from 27 (Strombach et al., 2015) to 1,049 (Ito, Saeki & Green, 2011). Sixty-five 
percent of studies (17/26) comprised samples of approximately 200 or fewer subjects. 
Settings: The vast majority of studies was conducted in developed countries, mainly the 
United States. Other countries where studies have been conducted include China (Boyer, 
Lienard & Xu, 2012; He & Jiang, 2013; Strombach et al., 2014), Germany (Böckler, Tusche 
& Singer, 2016; Strombach et al., 2014/2015/2016), Japan (Ito et al., 2011), Kenya (Boyer et 
al., 2012) and Poland (Osínski, 2010; Osínski, Karbowski & Ostaszewski, 2015). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(hypothetical) choices between a smaller monetary reward for themselves only (option A) or a larger reward 
shared equally with a specified number of persons (option B) (Osínski, Ostaszewski & Karbowski, 2014). 
Separate tasks are implemented for people related to the subjects in different ways from a social perspective, e.g. 
related or unrelated (Osínski et al., 2014) and strangers (unfamiliarity), acquaintances and friends (friendship), 
and relatives and family (kinship) (Ostaszewski & Osínski, 2011).   
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Experimental tasks: To explore the association of altruism with other preferences or choice 
sets, the SDT in some experiments has been employed in tandem with other experimental 
tasks, including Probability (PDT) and Delay Discounting Tasks (DDT) (in Economics better 
known as risk and time preference elicitation) (Boyer et al., 2012; Rachlin & Jones, 2008b; 
Yi et al., 2012; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012) as well as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (Locey, 
Safin & Rachlin, 2013) and Public Goods Game (PGG) (Jones & Rachlin, 2009). Strombach 
et al. (2015) implemented the SDT in a neuro-economics experiment, while Kaplan, Reed 
and McKerchar (2014) investigate the link of social discounting with experimental choices on 
environmental loss.  
Data: In addition to experimentally measuring social discounting and other social preferences, 
studies at the minimum collect basic socio-demographic information. Behavioural studies, 
moreover, i.e. investigations of the association of social discounting with behaviour, collect 
various additional data using questionnaires. Examples including smoking (Bradstreet et al., 
2011), culture (Strombach et al., 2014), problematic behaviour in boys (Sharp et al., 2012), 
and methamphetamine use (Yi et al., 2012). Other studies, notably those investigating the 
psychology of social discounting, collect data using psychometric instruments. One example 
is Olson et al. (2016), who employs the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS), the Empathy 
Quotient (EQ60), and the WASI intelligence test, while Böckler et al. (2016) utilise the Pro-
socialness Scale, Machiavelli Index, and Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).9 
Key empirical findings from social discounting experiments include the following: 
Findings: As expected, participants in these studies indicated that they would be much more 
generous to those close to them and much less generous to the socially distant. According to 
Sharp et al. (2011), this form of discounting refers to the fact that most people assign more 
value to the welfare of close affiliates than they do the welfare of distant affiliates. This 
empirical result at a theoretical level is consistent with kin-selection theory, because, even at 
the same social distance, participants were willing to forego significantly more money for the 
benefit of relatives than for the benefit of non-relatives (Rachlin & Jones, 2008a). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
                                                          
9  Böckler et al. (2016) utilise a battery of game theoretical and other tasks together with a social value 
orientation (SVO) scale and three other psychological trait scales to decompose key facets of human prosociality. 
Exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory (CFA) factor analysis is applied to fourteen different measure of human 
prosociality, of which the social discounting rate represents one and which is a strong and significant component 
of “altruistically motivated prosocial behaviour”. 
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Similar to time preferences or inter-temporal discounting, the hyperbolic discounting function 
better fits the data generated from the Social Discounting Task compared to the exponential 
function (Figure 1) (Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Locey et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2012). 
Various studies have investigated social discounting from a cross-cultural perspective, 
showing that social discounting functions are significantly different across individualistic (or 
Western) as opposed to collectivist (or Asian or African) cultures. Collectivist cultures have 
been found to be more altruistic than individualistic cultures (Boyer et al., 2012; Ito et al., 
2011; Strombach et al., 2014). 
Social discounting, as expected, is associated with time, risk and other social preferences. 
Social distance is correlated positively with rates of cooperation in a one-shot public goods 
game (Jones & Rachlin, 2009). The social discounting factor is also correlated with risk 
attitudes and time preferences, measured using Probability and Delay Discounting Tasks 
(Jones & Rachlin, 2009).10 
Three field experiments have investigated how social discounting relates to (problematic) 
human behaviour. Bradstreet et al. (2012) found that social discounting is a significant 
predictor of either smoking or quitting. Sharp et al.’s (2012) main finding is that boys 
functioning in the clinical range of indices of externalising behavioural problems 
demonstrated steeper social discounting compared to controls, i.e. that steeper social 
discounting (in this case less altruism) is correlated with forms of psychopathology in 
children. Yi et al. (2012), moreover, reported that active methamphetamine users, compared 
to non-using controls, exhibit higher social discounting, i.e. are less generous. 
In Psychology, social discounting experiments in some cases focuses on the behavioural 
moderators explaining observed differences in altruism, including intolerance of uncertainty 
and empathy (Olson et al., 2016) and cognitive load (Strombach et al., 2016), which impact 
social discounting differently in men and women.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
An important design feature of social discounting experiments that have been investigated 
experimentally is the use of hypothetical or real incentives. This one study, the one most 
relevant for the purpose of this paper as it has a similar goal, is the work of Locey et al. 
                                                          
10 According to Psychology’s Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), social discounting comprises 
one dimension only of psychological distance or horizon more broadly, together with delay and probability 
discounting (Kaplan et al., 2014; Yi et al., 2012). In this literature, social distance is defined as a subjective 
closeness toward a target person, which varies from very close to very distant (Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
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(2011) with 40 undergraduate Psychology students. Locey et al. (2011) found that real 
rewards as opposed to hypothetical rewards made no significant difference in the 
measurement of cooperation, although the social discounting function for real rewards was 
slightly higher than for hypothetical rewards (Figure 2), i.e. those receiving real rewards were 
more altruistic compared to those not paid in real money. 
Social discounting tasks may suffer from a number of limitations that are shared with the 
typical experiment on social preferences, such as experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2012). 
Experiment results, may be subject to “house money” effects (Carlson & Martinsson, 2013; 
Clark, 2002; Danková & Servátka, 2015) insofar as subjects are giving away the 
experimenter’s rather than their own money and therefore are relatively generous. 11 
Nevertheless it is not obvious why these effects should have a differential impact on partners 
who are near or far in social distance.  
3. Experiment 
In what follows, we outline the characteristics of participants and setting and the 
experimental procedure and treatment. 
Participants and setting: In this study, Rachlin and Jones’ (2008b) standard Social 
Discounting Task (SDT) was replicated twice in two separate sessions. The Session 1 
subjects are 45 undergraduate students at the University of the Free State in South Africa. 
Subjects were recruited using flyers distributed among students attending a lecture for third-
year Economics students. The subjects in Session 2 are 72 undergraduate students at the same 
university, recruited from among students attending a second-year Economics lecture. 
Ethics: Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the Faculty of Humanities at the 
University of the Free State (UFS-HUM-2015-74). Participation was voluntary and written 
informed consent was obtained from subjects. 
                                                          
11 The structure of the SDT game, however, does not take on the classical endowment-type game (such as a 
dictator, trust or voluntary contribution mechanism game), where decisions are made regarding the allocation 
from an endowment to another person or common pool and hence makes the “house money” effect a lesser 
threat to the methodological soundness of the task. Instead, decisions are made regarding a lesser amount of 
money for oneself or the same amount of money for someone else. Nevertheless, a between-subject 
experimental design can be used to answer the question as to whether an endowment effect is present, 
comparing the treatment in this experiment to an identical Social Discounting Task played after endowing 
subjects with real earned money equivalent to the amount given to the other person at each social distance (in 
this case R160) in exchange for performing a basic task. Yet, the amount to be kept may or may not be 
interpreted as an additional endowment, while the difference between the amount kept or sent may be 
considered a net endowment. These difficulties render the implementation of such design complex and likely 
impossible without modifying the structure of the original Social Discounting Task (SDT). 
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Procedure: Following a pilot of the relevant elicitation procedure with a small group of post-
graduate student subjects, a pencil-and-paper instrument including Rachlin and Jones’ 
(2008b) standard Social Discounting Task (SDT) was administered to study participants. 
First, the task was explained to subjects using detailed instructions and a practice table 
(Annexure A1). Subjects then completed a series of seven uniform tables, one for each social 
distance. In each table, subjects were asked to make choices between an amount of money for 
themselves versus an amount of money for each of the people on their social distance ladder. 
(Annexure A2). The basic instruction for each table was as follows: 
“Imagine you made a list of the 100 people closest to you in the world ranging from your 
dearest friend or relative at #1 to a mere acquaintance at #100. Now imagine the following 
choices between an amount of money for you and an amount for the #1 person on the list. 
Circle A or B on the right hand side to indicate which you would choose in EACH line.” 
In each case, the #1 in the above instruction and in the table and other forms, including the 
recipient questionnaire, was replaced by #2, #5, #10, #20, #50, #100, respectively. The task 
was counter-balanced, with the pages in half of the experimental packages organised in the 
standard ascending order and in the other half in descending order in terms of the seven social 
distances (see supplementary material). 
Subjects also completed two short questionnaires, providing brief information on the person 
occupying each social distance [recipient characteristics] (Annexure A4) and, finally, socio-
demographic details on themselves [sender characteristics] (Annexure A5). 
Treatment: On arrival at the venue, subjects were assigned consecutively to two different 
rooms. Approximately half of the participants were randomly assigned to the “real money” 
(payment) group (n=60). This group completed an adapted version of the standard task 
offering real pay-offs, the difference being the inclusion of specific payment instructions 
(Annexure A3). The other subjects were assigned to the “hypothetical money” (non-payment) 
group (n=57) and instructed to complete the standard non-incentivised task. A key difference 
in the instructions for the Social Discounting Task was a section that read, “None of your 
choices will be for actual money, but we ask that you still make choices as if real money were 
involved” (non-payment group) versus “One of the choices you make will be for real money”, 
with the inclusion of details of the payment procedure – Annexure A3) (payment group) (see 
supplementary material). 
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Payment: Subjects in Session 1 received a show-up fee of R30. Given the relatively low 
turnout in the first session, the show-up fee in Session 2 was increased to R50. On completion 
of the experiment, a within-subject random incentive system (RIS) was used to calculate 
subjects’ earnings (Baltussen et al., 2012), by first randomly selecting one of the seven social 
distances for each subject individually, then selecting one of the specific task’s ten rows 
randomly, and finally playing out the selected choice (A/B) on the selected row (Annexe A3). 
Where option A was selected, the relevant amount is paid to the subject, whereas where 
option B was selected, a person at the relevant social distance is nominated by the subject as 
recipient of the payment and subsequently paid.12 Each subject met individually with the 
experimenter or assistant to implement the randomised payment process and payment was 
made in private. Subjects on average earned R150 (exclusive of the show-up fee). Payments 
were cash and made via mobile phone. 
4. Analysis 
According to Olson et al. (2016: 60), the “social discounting paradigm is a powerful means of 
quantifying altruism in humans”. The Social Discounting Task (SDT) measures altruism (or 
prosocial behaviour more generally) as, the “amount of money a participant [is] willing to 
forego to give a fixed amount to another person” situated at a specific social distance 
(Rachlin & Jones, 2008b). The crossover value is the mean point at which the subject 
switched from choosing A to choosing B on each table.13 For example, if a subject chose the 
selfish option at R180 for me or R160 for you and switched to the generous option at R160 
for me or R160 for you, the crossover point is calculated as R170. If the subject switched 
between R100 for me or R160 for you and R80 for me or R160 for you, the crossover point is 
R90. Where option B was selected throughout, the crossover point is assumed to be R190 and 
where option A was selected throughout the crossover point is assumed to be zero.14    
                                                          
12 Payment, in theory, is anonymous, but the sender may disclose their identity to the recipient or the recipient in 
turn may ask the sender regarding the payment. Subjects were not asked or required to refrain from disclosing 
their identity to recipients. Where such disclosure is common, reciprocity may represent an important 
explanation for observed altruism (hypothesis 2 – see below). 
13 Inconsistent preferences remain a limitation with MPL-type elicitation tools such as the Social Discounting 
Task (SDT). Forty-eight or 41.1% of subjects switched multiple times from A to B on at least one table, which 
may be indicative of a lack of understanding or may reflect preference reversals. Sharp et al. (2012), however, 
report a much higher rate of inconsistent preferences, i.e. 66.5%. To deal with this problem, one could 
potentially rephrase the task so as to ask subjects to mark the one row where they would choose to switch from 
A to B, as in the sMPL variant of the multiple price list (MPL) elicitation method (Andersen et al., 2006). In this 
study, however, the original, standard social discounting task (SDT) protocol was implemented to allow 
comparability with other social discounting studies, in particular with Locey et al. (2011), who conducted a 
similar experiment. 
14 One, however, would not expect subjects to select A throughout, because the last option in row 10 is a choice 
between zero for oneself and R160 for the other person. Altruism should prevail and subjects preferring A over 
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Based on the literature, two main but opposing hypotheses guide the analysis of the crossing 
point data. On the one hand, it is hypothesised that subjects completing the incentivised task 
may be less altruistic than subjects completing the standard task. Generally, due to 
hypothetical bias (Vlaev, 2012), when faced with the prospect of earning real money (as 
opposed to giving money to others), subjects are expected to exhibit selfish behaviour and in 
this case to switch from A to B only in the latter rows of the table, specifically for the more 
socially distant recipients [hypothesis 1]. On the other hand, it could be hypothesised that 
subjects, under the condition of real incentives, may be more altruistic insofar as potential 
recipients, who receive actual money, can identify the donor (Locey & Rachlin, 2015) (who 
in turn in an act of reciprocity may potentially share that money with the subject). In other 
words, receivers may potentially learn from whom they may receive a payment and senders 
correspondingly may give more. Osínski (2010), in line with this, found that preferences for 
sharing increases as a function of prospects for reciprocity. Due to the presence of enforced 
reciprocity (Leider et al., 2009), subjects completing the incentivised task could therefore 
switch from A to B in the early rows, i.e. be more altruistic, especially at closer social 
distances [hypothesis 2].15 
In a similar manner, making payment real might also change the nature of the target 
individual. The null hypothesis is that treatment has no effect on the type of target, but we do 
not have a compelling formal or informal theory of how making payments real will change 
the set of recipients so we leave the alternative hypothesis open. 
The analysis comprises six components: first, the subject population is described in terms of 
their socio-demographic and other characteristics, disaggregating the analysis by treatment 
arm. As a precursor to the descriptive and multiple regression analysis of the main study 
outcomes, recipient characteristics are compared across the treatment arms and the seven 
social distances. A comparative descriptive account of the distribution of crossover values by 
social distance and treatment arm follows. Subsequently, social discounting functions are 
fitted individually on each subjects’ crossover values with the aid of Reed, Kaplan and 
Brewer’s (2012) Excel solver toolkit, using the following hyperbolic discounting function: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
B in row 1-9 should be switching to B in the final row. Yet, envious or spiteful subjects may choose to withhold 
R160 from another person, especially perhaps those at further social distances. Alternatively, subjects may not 
have fully understood the task and one could use such response as a manipulation check. In this study, a total of 
nineteen or 16.2% of subjects selected A throughout in one or more of the seven tables. If these responses are 
also considered inconsistent preferences, the total number of subjects exhibiting inconsistent preferences 
increases to fifty-nine (50.4%). 
15  Leider et al. (2009) decompose prosocial behaviour into baseline altruism (toward strangers), directed 
altruism (toward friends and relatives) and “giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction” (enforced 
reciprocity). 
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, where i,j represents the value person i attaches to the welfare of person j, Ai represents  the 
value person i associates with her own welfare, and Ni,j is the rank person i assigns to person j 
among i’s full list of associated people. The constant k measures the steepness of 
discounting: the greater k, the greater the degree of social discounting and the lower the 
degree of altruism (Sharp et al., 2012: 239). In addition, separate hyperbolic curves are fitted 
onto the median crossover values of the treatment (payment) and control (non-payment) 
groups. 
Area under the curve (AUC) analysis (Myerson, Green & Warusawitharana, 2001; Reed, 
Kaplan & Brewer, 2012) yields a single a-theoretical discounting parameter independent of 
functional form and inversely proportional to the rate of discounting, ranging from 0 
(complete discounting – less altruism) to 1 (no discounting – greater altruism) (Locey et al., 
2011; Osínski, 2010; Yi et al., 2011). An AUC index is constructed for each individual 
subject, using the Excel software of Reed, Kaplan and Brewer (2012), and then compared 
between the treatment (payment) and control (non-payment) groups using a two-sample t-test. 
In what follows, various regression models are first employed to regress social distance and 
sender and recipient characteristics on crossover values together with dummy variables for 
Session, and most importantly, for treatment (payment) status. Sender characteristics include 
age, gender, household poverty, and previous participation in experiments. Recipient 
characteristics include age, gender, family relationship16, and intergenerational solidarity.17 
Five different models are estimated: first, an ordered probit model is estimated, treating 
crossover values as an ordinal outcome. Assuming crossover values to be a continuous 
outcome, a pooled linear OLS regression model is estimated. Allowing for the panel nature of 
the data (i.e. subjects being observed multiple times), a linear random (RE) and fixed effects 
(FE) OLS model is estimated together with a mixed random effects regression model that 
allows the intercept and coefficient on social distance to vary across subjects. 
                                                          
16  “Family” includes partners, parents, siblings and other family, while “non-family” includes friends, 
neighbours, acquaintances, and strangers (Annexure A4). 
17 To explore the role of social dynamics in explaining differences in inter-personal altruism, a composite index 
of intergenerational solidarity was constructed using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). The index 
includes three components, namely associational, affectual and structural solidarity (Bengtson & Roberts, 1991). 
The three components are represented by the following questions: “How often do you communicate with this 
person?”; “On a ten-point scale, at an emotional and psychological level, how close do you perceive yourself to 
be to this particular person?”; “How far does this person life from you?” (Annexure A4). The percentage of 
inertia explained by the first dimension of the intergenerational solidarity construct is 64.6%. 
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Next, individual estimates of k, the natural logarithm of k, and the AUC index are employed 
as dependent variables alongside the following independent variables: payment and session 
dummies, and four sender characteristics, namely age, gender, household poverty, and 
previous experimental experience. In both cases, regression analyses are conducted for the 
full sample and restricted sample, which exclude all subjects with inconsistent preferences, 
i.e. multiple switches or zero crossovers.  
5. Results 
The results of the analysis are presented below. 
5.1 Sender characteristics 
Table 1 shows that the median age of subjects is 22 years. The majority of subjects are 
African females speaking Sesotho and, as expected given the recruitment strategy, enrolled in 
the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences. Furthermore, subjects are relatively 
well-off in terms of their financial situation, both in respect of their household’s poverty 
status (mostly laying on the 3rd rung of the poverty ladder) and their own personal financial 
position (two thirds of subjects were not broke). More than a third of subjects had applied for 
financial aid to the University, with only one in three having been successful. Only three 
subjects had previously participated in an experiment of a similar nature. When comparing 
subjects’ characteristics across the treatment and control group to assess the extent of balance, 
only the subject’s race  and application for financial aid was statistically significant. As many 
as 91.7% of subjects in the control group are African, compared to 71.9% in the treatment 
group (p=0.017). A greater proportion of subjects in the control group had applied for 
financial aid compared to the treatment group (p=0.006). All other variables did not differ 
significantly by treatment arm, thus suggesting some degree of balance on subject 
characteristics. 
[Table 1 about here]  
5.2 Recipient characteristics 
Because subjects can choose their own recipients and there are a large number of potential 
social relationship, it is not straightforward to measure the effect of making payment real on 
the choice of target. Based on the categories offered to the subjects, initially we group 
recipient types into the following groups: Partner, Parent, Sibling, Other family, Friend,   
Neighbour/acquaintance, Stranger and Other (see Table 2). We find no significant difference 
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in the categories chosen by treatment (chi-squared test, p =0.881). Grouping in other ways, 
such as family versus non-family also showed no significant differences between treatments. 
The results are summarised in Table 2 where we compare the pattern of recipients based on 
distance to subject, frequency of contact, age and gender. According to the evidence, the 
recipients identified by subjects for the most part are not statistically significantly different 
when compared by treatment (p>0.05), i.e. the recipients on average are indistinguishable. 
Only the difference in distance is weakly significant (p=0.083): when payment is real 
subjects are more likely to choose recipients living with them.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 however reveals that there as expected are strong, statistically significant differences 
between recipient characteristics across the seven social distances (p<0.001). Overall, 
recipients at closer social distances can be described as older female family members 
knowing the subject for longer than ten years. Closer recipients also daily communicate with 
subjects insofar as they generally live together. Moreover, recipients perceive their 
relationships with those recipients at close social distances to be emotionally and 
psychologically close. The opposite is true for recipients at greater social distance, where 
emotional and psychological ties are weak. 
[Table 3 about here] 
5.2.1 Payment and recipient characteristics 
To examine the effect of paying subjects on the characteristics of recipients we estimate 
equations of the form: 
𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +∑𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝐷𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=2
+∑𝛽3𝑖𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=2
+ 𝑋𝛽′ 
Where Payment is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if payment is actually made, SDi is a 
dummy for social distance at rank i (i=2, 5, 10, 50 and 100 – rank 1 is the omitted category) 
and X is a set of other control variables with β’ as the corresponding vector of parameters for 
X. In all the equations the controls are age of the subject, subject’s gender, subject’s prior 
experience of experiments and subject household’s poverty status. The dependent variables 
considered correspond to those described in Table 2 above. That is, physical distance to the 
recipient, psychological distance, solidarity, frequency of communication, age, gender and 
whether or not the recipient is family or other. For the last two variables we use a probit 
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model. For the other dependent variables, though the data is ordinal in some cases we use 
ordinary least squares (OLS).18 Table 4 presents the results of regression analysis of the link 
between payment and recipient characteristics. Since there are interaction terms to consider 
when evaluating the impact of treatment, instead of the regression coefficients we present 
estimates of the marginal effects (i.e. the effect of moving payment from 0 to 1) with standard 
errors estimated using the delta method. As can be seen, for most of the dependent variables 
there is little impact from making real payments. The exceptions to this pattern are physical 
and psychological distance. Making payments real makes it more likely that the person 
ranked 1st is someone living closer to the subject. Meanwhile for lower ranked positions, 
payment makes it more likely that the chosen recipient is someone living physically further 
away.19 One candidate explanation is that subjects realise that they might have to supply an 
address if the payment is real, but in fact the frequency of not knowing the subject’s address 
is almost the same in the two treatments (7.1% for the hypothetical payment and 11.1% for 
the real payment) and omitting this group of recipients does not alter the pattern of results.  In 
the case of psychological distance, payment has a negative and significant impact on the 
psychological closeness of recipients with lower ranks. That is, not-paying subjects means 
that they are more likely to state that they are close to lower ranked recipients. Note that for 
both physical and psychological distance payment does not have a significant impact on the 
mean distance. Rather it is the gradient that is changed by payment, which sharpens the 
difference between recipients chosen at the highest and lowest ranks. For the other features of 
recipients, whether the payment is real or not seems to have little or no impact on the 
recipient characteristics at any rank. In particular, subjects are not more likely to choose 
family members for example, when payment is real.  
[Table 4 about here] 
5.3 Crossover values 
Figure 3 shows the aggregate distribution of crossover points for subjects in the entire sample, 
illustrating considerable heterogeneity in the levels of altruism among subjects. Figure 4 
illustrates the distribution of crossover values for the control (non-payment) and treatment 
(payment) groups. A larger proportion of subjects in the control (non-payment) group crossed 
                                                          
18 Using an ordered probit model for instance, does little to change the pattern of results so we stick to the more 
straightforward OLS specification. 
19 In the physical distance question the last group are people whose addresses are not known to the subject. That 
does not exactly fit the distance concept. If we omit this group in the estimation, it does not change the pattern 
of negative coefficients for ranks closer to 1 and positive coefficients for ranks closer to 100.  
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over at the lowest crossover values compared to the treatment (payment) group. The opposite 
is observed at the opposite extreme, where a larger proportion of subjects in the treatment 
(payment) group crossed over compared to the control (non-payment) group. There is no 
discernible pattern at intermediate crossover values. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Table 5 reports the mean and median crossover values calculated across each of the seven 
social distances, by treatment arm. The mean crossover value for the payment (treatment) 
group is R113, compared to the non-payment (control) group’s mean of R108, a difference 
that is not statistically significant (p=0.242). The differences in mean and median crossover 
values are also not statistically significant across each individual social distance (p>0.05), nor 
does the median differ on aggregate between treatment arms (p=0.692). Therefore, there is 
insufficient evidence from this basic descriptive analysis to conclude that subjects in the 
payment (treatment) group are more or less altruistic than subjects in the non-payment 
(control) group by a statistically significant margin. Importantly, however, all four sets of 
figures reflect the strong negative association between expressed altruism and social distance.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Given the preliminary findings from the descriptive work, it is left to the regression analysis 
to determine which way the statistical evidence leans regarding the central research question. 
The ordered probit regression results for the crossover values are reported in column 1 in 
Table 6. The coefficients on social distance, as expected, are negative and highly statistically 
significant. The amount subjects are willing to forego to give someone else R160 declines as 
social distance increases (as illustrated in Figure 9). This is the case in each of the five 
regression models. The treatment dummy is statistically significant and positive, i.e. subjects 
in the treatment (payment) group are relatively more altruistic, which suggests that on 
aggregate the reciprocity effect may dominate hypothetical bias. Among the sender 
characteristics, previous experience in laboratory experiments is a strong predictor of altruism. 
Those with experimental experience are significantly more altruistic. Age also predicts 
crossover values: older subjects are relatively more altruistic. Gender is only weakly 
significant, with female subjects being more altruistic than male subjects. Recipients’ age 
also matters, with subjects being more altruistic toward older recipients. 
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[Figure 9 about here] 
Intergenerational solidarity has a positive and statistically significant sign. Altruism increases 
as intergenerational solidarity improves. As for the role of kinship and kin selection, which is 
highly correlated with social distance (Figure 10), the family dummy variable only turns 
highly statistically significant when the social distance variable is dropped from the 
regression models. (Results not reported here.) Figure 10 reports the mean crossover values 
for different social relations. As expected, subjects are more altruistic toward those close to 
them, especially their parents, and least altruistic toward mere acquaintances and strangers.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Table 6 about here] 
Next, the regression analysis is replicated using linear OLS. The results, as expected, do not 
change. With the exception of two coefficients, those for treatment (payment) and subject’s 
gender, both now not statistically significant; the random effects (RE) regression results 
mirror the findings from the pooled regression models. Furthermore, intergenerational 
solidarity now is only weakly significant, while the coefficient on social distance “2” turns 
highly significant. The random effects (RE) regression model, as expected, better explains 
variation in crossover values within subjects (R2 0.363) than between subjects (R2 0.110). 
The fixed effects (FE) regression model confirms the random effects (RE) results for social 
distance, recipient’s age, and intergenerational solidarity, and so too the mixed random 
effects (RE) model, the only exception being recipient’s gender, which now is positive and 
weakly statistically significant. In regards to sender characteristics, the mixed random effects 
(RE) model mirrors the standard linear random effects (RE) regression model, with sender’s 
age and previous experimental experience being positive and statistically significant, as was 
the case in each of the regression models. 
There are seven differences between the regression results for the restricted and full samples. 
Firstly, the payment dummy is not statistically significant in any of the five regression 
models. Secondly, the recipient’s age turns insignificant in the latter three regression models, 
while in the third instance the recipient’s gender never is statistically significant. Fifth, inter-
generational solidarity now is only significant in three regression models. Sixth, sender’s age 
and gender vary in terms of significance and generally is less significant. A final but major 
difference is that household poverty now is positive and statistically significant across the 
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five regression models. Otherwise, previous experimental experience remains a strong 
predictor of crossover values over the various estimators. 
5.4 Social discounting rate 
Figure 5 reports the distribution of ln(k) in the sample. The mean discount rate for subjects in 
the control (non-payment) arm is 0.077 compared to 0.038 in the treatment (payment) arm. 
The result is weakly significant in statistical terms (p=0.091). The difference is more 
pronounced when restricting the analysis to the smaller sample of subjects with consistent 
preferences: control – non-payment 0.099 versus treatment – payment 0.023 (p=0.069). 
Figure 6 illustrates the hyperbolic social discounting functions for each treatment arm. Paid 
subjects are more altruistic than non-incentivised subjects, particularly at greater social 
distances. There is some descriptive evidence, therefore, similar to Locey et al. (2011), in 
support of enforced reciprocity [hypothesis 2]. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
The aggregate figures are 0.058 (full sample) and 0.063 (restricted sample), which compares 
favourably to those reported by Jones and Rachlin (2006/09), Locey et al. (2011), Osínski 
(2010), Rachlin and Jones (2008b), and Sharp et al. (2012). However, the estimates fall 
below those reported by Strombach et al. (2014), but exceed those reported by Osínski, 
Karbowski and Ostaszewski (2015). 
[Figure 7 about here] 
In the next part of the analysis, summarized in Table 7, the treatment and session dummies 
and sender characteristics are regressed on individual discount rates (k), using Tobit and 
OLS regression models, respectively. First, the results are presented for the restricted sample. 
Two regressors are statistically significant in the Tobit regression model. Discounting rates 
(altruism) are significantly lower (greater) in those with previous experience in laboratory 
experiments and so too in the treatment (payment) arm of the study. The same results are 
obtained using the full sample, the only exception being that subject’s age now is negative 
and statistically significant. In other words, older subjects are more altruistic. Only in the 
OLS model with ln(k) for the restricted sample is previous experimental experience also 
statistically significant. However, this result is largely inconclusive as the OLS regression 
models do not pass the criterion for overall fit. 
[Table 7 about here] 
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5.5 Analysis under the curve 
The distribution of the AUC index across study subjects is reported in Figure 7. The mean 
AUC index for the control (non-payment) group (0.462) is slightly greater than the treatment 
(payment) group’s AUC (0.448). Contrary to the above results on k, subjects in the payment 
(treatment) are less altruistic than their counterparts in the non-payment (control) group, as 
would be the case under hypothetical bias. The corresponding figures for the restricted 
sample, which is slightly smaller than the estimates for the full sample, are 0.439 (control); 
0.433 (treatment); 0.436 (total). There however are no statistically significant differences 
between the payment and non-payment groups, be it for the full or restricted sample. 
Student subjects in this study (AUC = 0.455) in terms of altruism are more or less on par with 
student subjects in Poland (AUC 0.4 – 0.8) (Osínski, 2010) but considerably less altruistic 
than students in the US (AUC 0.61 – 0.69) (Locey et al., 2011), yet substantially more 
altruistic than students in another, earlier US experiment (AUC 0.256 / 0.369) (Jones & 
Rachlin, 2009). 
[Figure 9 about here] 
Figure 10 illustrates the (expected) negative relationship between the two measures of 
altruism, i.e. the lower k the higher the AUC index. The respective correlation coefficients 
are -0.485 (full sample) and -0.473 (restricted sample); both statistically significant. 
[Figure 10 about here] 
The AUC regression results are presented in Table 8. Both OLS regression models perform 
adequately in terms of overall fit (p<0.01). Only two independent variables are statistically 
significant, namely previous experimental experience (positive) (restricted and full samples) 
and subject’s age (positive) (full sample only). The evidence, with the exception of the 
payment dummy, corroborates the results from the Tobit model as applied to the full sample. 
[Table 8 about here] 
6. Conclusion 
This study conducts an SDT task with South African students and finds five key features in 
the result. First, the study presents some – albeit relatively weak - evidence that paying out 
the Social Discounting Task (SDT) matters, as has previously been reported for American 
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students by Locey et al. (2011). In particular the evidence suggests that paying leads to a 
higher cross-over point compared to the treatment where payments are hypothetical. 
Secondly, we find evidence that making payments real changes the set of target recipients. In 
particular it has an effect on physical and psychological distance to recipients although it 
appears to have no systematic effect on age, gender, frequency of communication, years 
known and sense of solidarity. The effect depends on rank, and means that the gradient of 
distance is higher when payment is made – more highly ranked individuals are closer 
physically and psychologically when payment is real and lower ranked individuals are further 
away. 
Third, subjects on aggregate exhibit an inverse relationship between social distance and 
altruism in accordance with the 1/d law of giving (Goeree et al., 2010), where more (less) is 
given to closer (distant) relations. This key finding provides support for the kin selection 
theory, that greater altruism toward close relatives occurs in order to ensure the continuation 
of shared genes (Jones & Rachlin, 2008b). 
Further support for this claim on kin selection theory lies in the importance in the analysis of 
family relations and inter-generational solidarity as predictor of inter-personal altruism. 
According to this fourth finding, the nature of the specific relationship between sender and 
recipient is critical. Subjects exhibiting greater intergenerational solidarity with recipients are 
more altruistic as are subjects related by blood or close social ties.  
Finally, although we do not have an exact comparator group, there is no evidence that 
preferences for altruistic acts in this student population are substantially different from 
student populations from so-called WEIRD countries. 
The study has a number of limitations that are shared with the typical experiment on social 
preferences, such as the possibility of experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2012) and the 
difficulty of generalising from a group of subjects from one Faculty at a single university in 
but one country. Nevertheless it provides evidence that the social distance task can be used 
successfully in settings outside Western industrialised nations. However, it suggests that 
having hypothetical payments may have a subtle influence on the choice of target recipients 
and also on the degree of expressed altruism.  
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Figure 1: Exponential and hyperbolic social discounting functions  
 
Source: Jones & Rachlin (2006:285) 
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Figure 2: Mean crossover points, for hypothetical and real rewards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Locey et al. (2011: 21) 
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Table 1: Subjects – descriptive characteristic, by treatment arm 
Note: Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
 
 Payment Non-Payment Total p-value 
Age (years)     
 Mean 22.3 22.7 22.5 0.186 
 Median [IQR] 22[24-21] 22[23.5-21] 22[24-21] 0.885 
     
Female (%) 54.4 63.3 59.0 0.325 
     
Population Group     
 African 71.9 91.7 82.1 0.017 
 Coloured 3.5 3.3 3.4  
 Asian 10.5 - 5.1  
 White 14.0 5.0 9.4  
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  
     
Language     
 Sotho 38.6 40.0 39.3 0.935 
 Afrikaans 8.8 8.3 8.6  
 Venda 8.8 6.7 7.7  
 Xhosa 8.8 11.7 10.3  
 Sepedi 1.8 1.7 1.7  
 Tswana 13.3 8.8 11.1  
 English 15.8 6.7 11.1  
 Tsonga 1.8 3.3 2.6  
 Zulu 3.5 5.0 4.3  
 Other 3.5 3.3 3.4  
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  
     
Faculty     
 Economic and Management 82.5 68.3 75.2 0.443 
 Natural and Agricultural 8.8 18.3 13.7  
 Health 3.5 5.0 4.3  
 Education - 1.7 0.9  
 Law - 1.7 0.9  
 Humanities 5.1 5.0 5.1  
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  
     
Household Poverty     
 1 (poorest) - 3.3 1.7 0.629 
 2 13.3 12.3 12.8  
 3 52.6 55.0 53.9  
 4 31.6 26.7 29.1  
 5 3.5 1.7 2.6  
 6 (richest) - - -  
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  
     
Financial Situation     
 Very Broke 8.8 11.7 10.3 0.426 
 Broke 33.3 31.7 32.5  
 Neither 26.3 36.7 31.6  
 In good shape 31.6 20.0 25.6  
 In very good shape - - -  
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  
     
Applied for financial aid (yes) 21.1 45.0 33.3 0.006 
     
Received financial aid (yes) 10.5 11.7 11.1 0.844 
     
Previous experimental experience (yes) 1.8 3.3 2.6 0.531 
     
Sample (n) 60 57 117  
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Table 2: Recipients – descriptive characteristics (n=819), by treatment arm 
 Payment  Non-payment Total p-value 
Age (years)     
  Mean 31.8 32.7 32.2 0.793 
  Median [IQR] 26[41-21] 26[44-21] 26[42-21] 0.769 
     
Female (%) 77.2 71.7 74.4 0.494 
     
Relation     
  Partner 8.8 6.7 7.7 0.881 
  Parent 68.4 70.0 69.2 
  Sibling 12.3 8.3 10.3 
  Other family 5.3 6.7 6.0 
  Friend 5.3 6.7 6.0 
  Neighbour/acquaintance - 1.7 0.9 
  Stranger - - - 
  Other - - - 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
Relation     
  Family 55.9 58.1 57.0 0.524 
  Non-family 44.1 41.9 43.0 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
How long known     
  < 1 year 1.8 3.3 2.6 0.466 
  1-2 years 1.8 1.7 1.7 
  2-3 years 3.5 6.7 5.1 
  3-5 years - 5.0 2.6 
  5-10 years 7.0 3.3 5.1 
  > 10 years 86.0 80.0 82.9 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
Communication     
  Daily 57.9 45.0 51.3 0.387 
  A few times a week 26.3 38.3 32.5 
  Once a week 3.5 5.0 4.3 
  A few times a month 5.3 5.0 5.1 
  Once a month - 3.3 1.7 
  A few times a year 5.3 1.7 3.4 
  Less frequently 1.8 - 0.9 
  No contact - 1.7 0.9 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
Distance     
  We live together 56.1 31.7 43.6 0.083 
  Within walking distance 10.5 10.0 10.3 
  Same town/village/city 3.5 8.3 6.0 
  Another town/village/city 19.3 35.0 27.4 
  Another country 10.5 15.0 12.8 
  Do not know where person lives - - - 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
Psychological and emotional distance     
  Mean 6.5 6.2 6.3 0.111 
  Median [IQR] 7[9-4] 6[9-4] 7[9-4] 0.365 
Note: Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding off. 
 
 
 31 
Table 3: Recipients – descriptive characteristics, by social distance 
 1 2 5 10 20 50 100 Total p-value 
Age (years)          
  Mean 41.1 35.5 28.5 33.0 28.5 29.7 29.4 32.2 <0.001 
  Median [IQR] 47[52-26] 30[50-23] 23[31-19] 25[40-22] 24[33-21] 25[33-21] 24[30-21] 26[42-21]  
Age differential (mean) 18.6 13.0 6.0 10.6 6.0 7.2 6.9 9.8 <0.001 
          
Female (%) 74.4 58.9 48.7 56.4 51.3 51.3 42.7 54.8 <0.001 
          
Relation          
  Partner 7.7 14.5 14.5 8.6 5.1 2.6 0.9 7.7 <0.001 
  Parent 69.2 30.8 6.8 4.3 0.9 0.9 1.7 16.4 
  Sibling 10.3 35.0 29.1 6.0 3.4 4.3 0.9 12.7 
  Other family 6.0 12.8 30.8 42.7 35.9 23.1 6.0 22.5 
  Friend 6.0 5.1 15.4 31.6 33.3 13.7 4.3 15.6 
  Neighbour/acquaintance 0.9 - 2.6 5.1 20.5 47.0 24.8 14.4 
  Stranger - 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 7.7 60.7 10.4 
  Other - - - 0.9 - 0.9 0.9 0.4 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
Relation          
  Family 92.3 89.7 76.9 57.3 43.6 29.9 9.4 57.0 <0.001 
  Non-family 7.7 10.3 23.1 42.7 56.4 70.1 90.6 43.0 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
How long known          
  < 1 year 2.3 2.6 1.7 4.3 5.1 28.2 65.8 15.8 <0.001 
  1-2 years 1.7 3.4 7.7 6.8 15.4 15.4 9.4 8.6 
  2-3 years 5.1 6.8 7.7 5.1 10.3 14.5 6.0 7.9 
  3-5 years 2.6 8.6 10.3 14.5 14.5 6.8 3.4 8.7 
  5-10 years 5.1 3.4 9.4 17.0 19.7 10.3 2.6 9.7 
  > 10 years 82.9 75.2 63.3 52.1 35.0 24.8 12.8 49.4 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
Sample (n) 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 819  
Note: Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
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Table 3: Recipients – descriptive characteristics, by social distance (continued) 
 
 1 2 5 10 20 50 100 Total p-value 
Communication          
  Daily 51.3 41.0 25.6 11.1 12.8 12.0 3.4 22.5 <0.001 
  A few times a week 32.5 33.3 34.2 24.8 18.0 15.4 6.0 23.4 
  Once a week 4.3 5.1 6.8 10.3 11.1 5.1 5.1 6.8 
  A few times a month 5.1 12.8 14.5 25.6 18.8 13.7 6.8 13.9 
  Once a month 1.7 - 6.8 7.7 11.1 9.4 1.7 5.4 
  A few times a year 3.4 6.0 7.7 15.4 17.1 20.5 14.5 12.1 
  Less frequently 0.9 0.9 1.7 1.7 8.6 13.7 21.4 7.0 
  No contact 0.9 0.9 2.6 3.4 2.6 10.3 41.0 9.0 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
Distance          
  We live together 43.6 41.0 18.0 8.6 6.0 5.1 4.3 18.1 <0.001 
  Within walking distance 10.3 7.7 15.4 16.2 23.1 18.0 6.8 13.9 
  Same town/village/city 6.0 12.8 27.4 35.9 32.5 34.2 21.4 24.3 
  Another town/village/city 27.4 28.2 29.1 28.2 27.4 23.1 8.6 24.5 
  Another country 12.8 9.4 10.3 10.3 9.4 9.4 9.4 10.1 
  Do not know where person lives - 0.9 - 0.9 1.7 10.3 49.6 9.0 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          
Psychological/emotional distance          
  Mean 9.1 8.7 7.7 6.6 5.6 4.3 2.4 6.3 <0.001 
  Median [IQR] 10[10-8] 9[10-8] 8[9-6] 7[8-5] 5[7-4] 4[6-3] 1[3-1] 7[9-4]  
          
Sample (n) 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 819  
Note: Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
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Table 4: Payment and recipient characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Effect of payment Physical 
distance 
Psychological 
distance 
Solidarity Years Known Communication Family 
(probit) 
Age Gender 
(probit) 
At mean rank 0.029 -0.242    -0.048    0.019    0.078 0.006 1.272    0.0002    
 (0.131) (0.182) (0.058) (0.139) (0.182) (0.049) (1.003) (0.035) 
At rank 1 -0.726** 0.305 0.028 0.221 -0.074 0.547 -2.052 0.183 
 (0.282) (0.276) (0.038) (0.216) (0.259) (0.490) (2.887) (0.254) 
At rank 2 0.259 0.046 0.051 -0.319 -0.206 -0.944* 2.654 -0.051 
 (0.315) (0.241) (0.049) (0.292) (0.286) (0.566) (4.698) (0.385) 
At rank 5 0.809*** -0.624** 0.012 0.061 -0.020 -0.511 5.924 0.020 
 (0.283) (0.314) (0.042) (0.317) (0.337) (0.504) (4.224) (0.315) 
At rank 10 0.733** -0.697** 0.027 -0.170 0.260 -0.616 4.925 -0.452 
 (0.320) (0.349) (0.063) (0.335) (0.374) (0.494) (4.177) (0.319) 
At rank 20  0.869*** -0.661 -0.040 -0.028 0.190 -0.395 2.790 -0.280 
 (0.321) (0.428) (0.072) (0.372) (0.436) (0.482) (3.920) (0.332) 
At rank 50 1.175*** -0.948* -0.072 -0.269 0.497 -0.555 5.129 -0.018 
 (0.322) (0.511) (0.191) (0.431) (0.447) (0.522) (4.070) (0.312) 
At rank 100 1.439*** -0.944* -0.509* -0.692 0.346 -0.510 1.845 -0.471 
Observations 819 819 819 819 819 819 819 819 
R-squared 0.209 0.604 0.493 0.369 0.384 - 0.097 - 
Note: Effect of payment is the estimated effect of a discrete change in payment from 0 to 1. ‘At mean rank’ is the effect evaluated at the sample mean of 
social distance. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for age, gender, poverty status and experimental 
experience of sender. 
 34 
Figure 3: Crossover points, aggregate distribution (n=117) 
 
Note: Data for all participants who crossed over multiple times between A and B is included in the above analysis, with the 
first reported crossover being used as the crossover point. 
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Figure 4: Crossover points, by treatment arm (n=117) 
 
Note: Data for all participants who crossed over multiple times between A and B is included in the above analysis, with the 
first reported crossover being used as the crossover point. 
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Table 5: Mean and median crossover values (Rand), by social distance and treatment arm 
 
Social 
distance 
Mean Median 
 
Payment 
Non-
payment 
 
p-value 
 
Total 
 
Payment 
Non-
payment 
 
p-value 
 
Total 
1 152.98 151.83 0.895 152.39 170 170 0.836 170 
2 136.84 136.83 0.999 136.83 150 150 0.836 150 
5 128.24 114.83 0.129 121.36 130 130 0.682 130 
10 117.89 104.16 0.165 110.85 130 90 0.318 110 
20 104.56 101.33 0.738 102.90 90 100 0.635 90 
50 85.96 86.33 0.971 86.15 70 90 0.318 70 
100 67.54 65.33 0.840 66.41 70 50 0.635 50 
Total 113.43 108.66 0.242 110.98 110 110 0.692 110 
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Table 6a: Regression analysis – crossover values (Rand) – full sample 
 Ordered probit 
[pooled] 
OLS 
[pooled] 
 
Random Effects (RE) 
 
Fixed Effects (FE) 
Random Effects (RE) 
[mixed] 
Social distance (comparison = 1)      
  2 -0.3134** -12.9017** -13.2585*** -13.3532*** -13.0132*** 
  5 -0.5367*** -24.9367*** -25.9768*** -26.2491*** -25.5579*** 
  10 -0.7380*** -36.1666*** -37.2859*** -37.5776*** -37.0484*** 
  20 -0.8279*** -41.8904*** -43.4155*** -43.8135*** -43.1002*** 
  50 -1.1030*** -56.1197*** -58.1850*** -58.7275*** -58.0600*** 
  100 -1.3298*** -65.6197*** -69.4446*** -70.4642*** -69.8709*** 
      
Payment 0.1679** 8.1301** 8.1141  8.1293 
Session -0.8547 -3.2659 -1.5916  -0.5472 
      
Recipient characteristics:      
Age  0.0070*** 0.3215*** 0.2636** 0.2486** 0.2702*** 
Gender (comparison = male) 0.0608 2.6978 3.2959 3.4403 4.7794* 
Family member 0.1078 4.9321 2.1174 1.4086 2.2053 
Solidarity index (MCA) 0.1342** 6.6737** 5.5466* 5.2397* 5.0705* 
      
Sender characteristics:      
Age  0.0770*** 3.8275*** 3.8505***  3.5683** 
Gender (comparison = male) 0.1275* 7.0129* 6.9092  4.4593 
Household poverty ranking  -0.1292 -0.6047 -0.7362  -1.7987 
Experimental experience (yes) 0.1961*** 10.7436*** 10.7354***  9.1926*** 
      
Sample (n) 819 819 819 819 819 
Wald chi2 / F-test 181.30*** 19.70*** 240.46*** 17.19*** 291.69*** 
(Pseudo) R2 0.0631 0.2675 0.2668 0.2334  
Breusch & Pagan LM test   336.80***   
Note: Regression models in all cases are estimated using robust standard errors. Session = Session 2 (comparison = Session 1); statistical significance (1%)*** (5%)** (10%)* 
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Table 6b: Regression analysis – crossover values (Rand) – restricted sample 
 Ordered probit 
[pooled] 
OLS 
[pooled] 
 
Random Effects (RE) 
 
Fixed Effects (FE) 
Random Effects (RE) 
[mixed] 
Social distance (comparison = 1)      
  2 -0.4477** -17.2084** -18.0865*** -18.2226*** -17.9496*** 
  5 -0.6903*** -30.0039*** -31.8945*** -32.2328*** -31.4826*** 
  10 -0.9671*** -42.9006*** -45.3559*** -45.7946*** -44.4094*** 
  20 -1.0194*** -45.3674*** -48.5896*** -49.1647*** -47.5614*** 
  50 -1.3059*** -58.2677*** -61.7451*** -62.3624*** -59.6772*** 
  100 -1.5372*** -66.6980*** -70.1545*** -70.7655*** -65.1077*** 
      
Payment 0.0894 2.9703 3.3074  0.9027 
Session -0.2155 -9.3466 -5.4753  -3.3441 
      
Recipient characteristics:      
Age  0.0078** 0.3313** 0.2014 0.1784 0.1624 
Gender (comparison = male) 0.1023 3.7081 4.1264 4.1888 5.3746 
Family member 0.0187 0.7988 -5.9888 -7.1981 -3.1313 
Solidarity index (MCA) 0.1008 4.8763 4.8181* 4.8112* 6.7696*** 
      
Sender characteristics:      
Age  0.0402* 1.9244** 2.0932  2.9088* 
Gender (comparison = male) 0.2429** 11.6026** 11.9984  12.9026 
Household poverty ranking  0.2404*** 11.7682*** 11.5214*  10.8479* 
Experimental experience (yes) 0.4015*** 18.8617*** 18.6841***  15.9046*** 
      
Sample (n) 406 406 406 406 406 
Wald chi2 / F-test 122.85*** 14.65*** 236.84*** 12.30*** 208.54*** 
(Pseudo) R2 0.0779 0.3141 0.3115 0.2428  
Breusch & Pagan LM test   238.18***   
Note: Regression models in all cases are estimated using robust standard errors. Session = Session 2 (comparison = Session 1); statistical significance (1%)*** (5%)** (10%)* 
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Figure 5: Difference in crossover points, by social distance 
 
Note: The graph plots the coefficients from the mixed Random Effects (RE) regression model (Table 5). 
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Figure 6: Crossover point, by relation 
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Figure 7: Social discounting rate (k), by treatment arm 
(a) Restricted sample 
 
(b) Full sample 
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Figure 8: Hyperbolic social discounting functions, by treatment arm 
 
Note: Data for participants who crossed over multiple times between A and B are included in the analysis, with the first 
reported cross-over used as the cross-over point. 
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Table 7: Regression analysis – social discounting rate (k) 
 Restricted Sample Full Sample 
 Tobit (k) OLS (log k) Tobit (k) OLS (log k) 
Treatment:     
Payment -0.0988* -0.5676 -0.0513* 0.0322 
     
Design:     
Session 0.0531 0.1546 -0.0058 -0.4184 
     
Sender characteristics:     
Age  0.0009 0.0364 -0.0068** -0.0703 
Gender (comparison = male) -0.0131 0.0608 -0.0149 0.0873 
Household poverty ranking  -0.0038 -0.3614 0.0072 -0.2250 
Experimental experience (yes) -0.1165** -2.0540*** -0.0468* -0.2608 
     
Sample (n) 57 50 116 99 
F-test 2.54** - 1.88* 0.91 
(Pseudo) R2 0.3202 0.1193 0.0794 0.0470 
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Figure 9: Area under the curve (AUC), by treatment arm 
(a) Restricted sample 
 
(b) Full sample 
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Figure 10: Scatterplot – discounting rates (k) and area under the curve (AUC) 
(a) Restricted sample 
 
(b) Full sample 
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Table 8: Regression analysis – area under the curve (AUC) 
 Restricted Sample Full Sample 
Treatment:   
Payment 0.0135 0.0078 
   
Design:   
Session -0.0255 0.0277 
   
Sender characteristics:   
Age  0.0068 0.0258*** 
Gender (comparison = male) 0.0654 0.0449 
Household poverty ranking  0.0473 0.0005 
Experimental experience (yes) 0.1195*** 0.0784*** 
   
Sample (n) 58 117 
F-test 13.68*** 12.83*** 
(Pseudo) R2 0.1485 0.1084 
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Annexure A1: Social Discounting Task (SDT) – introduction and practice table 
 
SOCIAL DISCOUNTING TASK 
 
First, let us look at an example of how the task works and how we will calculate your 
earnings from the particular task. 
The following experiment asks you to imagine that you have made a list of the 100 people 
closest to you in the world ranging from your dearest friend or relative at position #1 to a 
mere acquaintance at #100. The person at number one would be someone you know well and 
is your closest friend or relative. The person at #100 might be someone you recognize and 
encounter but perhaps you may not even know their name. 
You do not have to physically create the list- just imagine that you have done so. 
For example, imagine the following choices between an amount of money for you and an 
amount for person #75 on the list. Circle A or B on the right hand side to indicate which 
option you would choose in EACH line,. Please note that there is no wrong or right answer, 
simply indicate whether you would choose A or B in each row. 
 
 OPTION A: OPTION B: CIRCLE 
1. R90 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
2. R80 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
3. R70 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
4. R60 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
5. R50 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
6. R40 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
7. R30 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
8. R20 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
9. R10 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
10. R0 for you alone R80 for person #75 on the list A B 
  
Row selected for payment:  
Option (A/B):  
 
Please complete the exercise table now. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
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Annexure A2: Social Discounting Task (SDT) – standard table 
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Annexure A3: Social Discounting Task (SDT) – treatment script 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Payment: 
 
You will complete seven of these tables. 
First, we will randomly select one of these tables using a dice. 
Then, one of the ten rows in the selected table will be selected randomly using a ten-sided 
dice. 
The selected decision will be implemented, i.e. we will pay you the actual amount of money 
for real for the choice you have made. 
For example, looking at the above exercise table and assuming this table was selected for 
payment, if row 3 was selected randomly for payment and you had chosen option B, then we 
will pay person #75 on your list R80 (we will collect this information from you later). If you 
had chosen option A, we will pay you R70. 
If row 8 was selected, and you chose option A, we will pay you R20. If you chose B, we will 
pay person #75 on your list R80. 
 
Next you will be asked to answer a series of questions about this particular person at a given 
social distance. In each case, imagine the person who best fits the specific position (#1 to 
#100) and answer each question. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
Let us play the first table now. 
Please remember that there is no wrong or right answer, simply indicate whether you would 
choose A or B in each row. 
Please take care when completing the tables as the values are different from those in the 
exercise table. 
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Annexure A4: Social discounting – recipient questionnaire 
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Annexure A5: Social discounting – post-experimental subject questionnaire 
 
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please provide us with the following information – please note that all information will be 
kept confidential and nobody else will know what you have written: 
 
1. Age:   years 
 
2. Gender: Male = 1 Female = 2 
 
Note: Circle ONE option ONLY. 
 
3. Race: African/Black = 1 Coloured = 2 Asian/Indian = 3 White = 4 
 
Note: Circle ONE option ONLY. 
 
4. Home 
language: 
Afrikaans = 1 English = 2 IsiNdebele = 3 IsiXhosa = 4 IsiZulu = 5 Sepedi = 6 
Sesotho = 7 Setswana = 8 Siswati = 9 Tshivenda = 10 Xitsonga = 11 Other = 12 
 
Note: Circle ONE option ONLY. 
 
5. Faculty: Economic 
and 
Management 
Sciences 
= 1 
Education 
 
 
= 2 
Health 
Sciences 
 
= 3 
Humanities 
 
 
= 4 
Law 
 
 
= 5 
Natural and 
Agricultural 
Sciences 
= 6 
Theology 
 
 
= 7 
 
Note: Circle ONE option ONLY. 
 
6. Imagine a six-step ladder where the poorest 
in South Africa stand at the bottom (the first 
step) and the richest people in South Africa 
stand on the highest step (the sixth step). On 
which step are your household today? 
Poorest 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
Richest 
 
6 
 
Note: Circle ONE option ONLY. 
 
7. How will you describe your financial situation today? Very broke 1 
(i.e. the status of your personal finances) Broke 2 
 Neither  3 
 In good shape 4 
Note: Mark ONE option ONLY. In very good shape 5 
 
8. Have you applied to UFS for financial aid? Yes = 1 No = 0 
 
Note: Circle ONE option ONLY. 
 
9. Were you awarded financial aid from UFS? Yes = 1 No = 0 
 
Note: Circle ONE option ONLY. 
 
10. Have you previously participated in any experiment of this nature? Yes = 1 No = 0 
 
Note: Circle ONE option ONLY. 
 
 
 
 
 
